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Labor Law
by Stephen W. Mooney*
and
Leigh Lawson Reeves"
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys the 1994 decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that impacted on the areas of traditional labor law. This Article specifically addresses decisions by the
Eleventh Circuit under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA7),1 the
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 2 the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 ("FLSA7),3 the Occupational Safety and Hazard Act
("OSHA),'5 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA7).

Given the volume of cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit in the area
of traditional labor law this past survey year, this Article does not
address every case. It does attempt, however, to address the noteworthy
decisions issued by the Eleventh Circuit in 1994. As in years past, this
survey year the Eleventh Circuit considered several cases covering a
wide variety of issues. The majority of cases revisited old rules and
attempted to clarify their use through the facts presently before the

* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Institute
of Technology (B.S.I.M., 1983); Texas Tech University School of Law (J.D., 1987). Member,
State Bar of Georgia and State Bar of Texas.
** Associate in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.S., 1985); Mercer University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1991). Member, Mercer
Law Review (1989-1991); Senior Managing Editor (1990-1991). Member, State Bar of
Georgia and State Bar of South Carolina.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§151-169 (1988).
2. Id. §§ 141-187.
3. Id. §§ 209-219.
4. Id. §§ 651-678.
5. Id, §§ 1001-1461.
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court. Some cases, however, addressed new issues and broke new
ground in the area of traditional labor law.

II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

A.

JudicialReview of Arbitration Awards
As in the years past, the Eleventh Circuit again addressed the
standard for judicial review of an arbitration award. In Interstate
Brands Corp. v. Local 441 Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union
AFL-CIO,' the court of appeals reiterated the long-standing policy that
although the court generally gave a great deal of deference to an
arbitrator's award, when the award did not "draw its essence from the
[labor] contract,", then the reviewing court need not defer to the
arbitrator's conclusions.7 In this particular case, the employer, Merita
Bakery, employed several truck drivers to deliver bakery goods
throughout the Southeast. These drivers were represented by a local
union. In May 1993, a driver named Willard Hamrick was informed by
his supervisor that he was due for a physical examination, which also
included the Department of Transportation ("DOT") mandated drug
testing. This testing was subsequently performed and Mr. Hamrick
tested positive for illegal drugs. Consequently, he was terminated from
his position.8
Shortly thereafter, pursuant to the labor contract, Mr. Hamrick
requested that his termination be reviewed by an arbitrator which would
then be binding on all parties. The arbitrator framed the issue to be
determined as "whether the urine test ... [met] the criteria of the
[DOT's] standards and, if so, whether the penalty of discharge twas
appropriate under the company drug policy. 9 The arbitrator did not
find fault with the collection site or the laboratory procedures but,
instead, held that the DOT Regulation 40.25(c) required a chain of
custody in the handling of the specimen and that there was a break in
the chain in this case (i.e. couriers of specimen between collection site
and laboratory did not sign the shipping box). Based upon this break in
chain of custody, the specimen could not be considered in his analysis of

6.
7.
8.
9.

39 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1160-61.
Id. at 1161.
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whether or not Mr. Hamrick's termination was proper; thus, he excluded
it from the arbitration and ordered Mr. Hamrick to be reinstated.10
The employer, Merita Bakery, then brought suit against the union
challenging the arbitration award.1
The district court granted
summary judgment to the union and upheld the arbitration award in its
entirety. Merita then appealed the award to the Eleventh Circuit.'2
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that although their review of
arbitration awards was generally very limited, this did not mean that
they were bound by each and every arbitration award that was
issued. 3 The court reiterated the long-standing principle that they
would not consider the merits of an award if it was argued that the
award rested on errors of fact or on a misinterpretation of the contract. " ' When the award, however, [did] not "draw its essence from the
contract, but rather reflect[ed] the arbitrator's 'own brand of industrial
justice,' the [Eleventh Circuit held that the] reviewing court need not
defer to the arbitrator's conclusions." 15
The Eleventh Circuit then went on to find that the arbitrator in this
case went beyond the collective bargaining agreement when he
attempted to interpret the actual DOT regulations requiring a "chain of
custody" for the specimen.' 6 Since the arbitrator's analysis was
confined to the DOT regulations and his interpretation of them, rather
than his interpretation of the actual contract between the union and the
employer, the court was not bound by his findings of fact. Thus, the
issue became whether or not the arbitrator was correct when he found
that section 40.25(k) required such a stringent chain of custody
requirement and, specifically, whether it required the signature of each
and every individual who handled the sealed
shipping box between the
7
collection site and the testing laboratory.
In reviewing the DOT regulations concerning chain of custody
requirements, the court paid special attention to the interpretation of the
regulations shared by the DOT.' The DOT contended they had never
interpreted their regulations to require couriers, postal employees, or
other intervening personnel involved in the transportation of urine

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1160.
at 1161-62.
at 1162.
(citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)

(citations omitted)).

16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 1163.
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specimens, to make specific chain of custody entries.' 9 The court of
appeals pronounced the general rule that "[a court] owe[d] substantial
deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation."' Since
the DOT's construction of its custody and control regulation was
reasonable, the Eleventh Circuit found that such stringent chain of
custody procedures, as ruled upon by the arbitrator, did not have to be
followed as was ruled upon by the arbitrator.2 Thus, the court of
appeals held that the specimen was incorrectly excluded from' the
arbitrator's consideration; therefore, they reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.'m
B. Exhaustion of ContractRemedies as a Requirement for Bringing
Breach of Contract Suit
In Thomas v. Kroger Co.,' a discharged employee brought an action
against her employer alleging that she was terminated on the basis of
her race in violation of her collective bargaining agreement and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2OOe-2.' The employer
filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that
the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the contract remedies outlined in her
collective bargaining agreement; thus, she had not met the prerequisites
needed to bring a breach of contract claim in federal court.25 The
district court agreed with the employer and dismissed the plaintiff's
breach of contract claim. The plaintiff then filed an appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit.2'
The Eleventh Circuit reiterated the earlier United States Supreme
Court holding that "federal labor policy requires that individual
employees wishing to assert contract grievances must [initially] attempt
use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by the employer and
union as a means of redress."27 Thus, the analysis became whether or
not the plaintiff had exhausted the grievance procedures outlined2in her
union contract; if not, her claim would necessarily be dismissed. 8

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
1985)).

Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1163 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381,2386 (1994)).
Id.
Id. at 1164.
24 F.3d 147 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 148-50.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 149-50 (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965)).
Id. at 150 (citing Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir.
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The facts in this case demonstrated that the plaintiff was a member
of the United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1063 Union and was
covered by its collective bargaining agreement with the employer. This
contract provided for a four step procedure for dispute resolution; and,
if the parties agreed, they could skip the intermediary steps in favor of
an immediate "step three" conference. If those conferences failed, the
matter would then be referred to arbitration.'
After the plaintiff's termination, she did file a grievance with the
union to initiate the dispute resolution process. A "step three" meeting
was scheduled between the union, the plaintiff, and the company's
representative. The plaintiff was informed of this meeting, and she
explained that she wished to have her lawyer present. The union
representative told her that she could not bring her lawyer to the "step
three" meeting, and on the night the meeting occurred, the plaintiff
failed to attend. The meeting went forward in the plaintiff's absence,
and she later received a letter from her employer stating that the
investigation of her discharge was complete and that the termination
decision was final.3'
Based on these facts, the Eleventh Circuit found that since the
plaintiff was aware of the meeting and she simply failed to attend, she
had not exhausted her contractual remedies.3 1 The fact that the
plaintiff had wanted her lawyer to attend this meeting was not a
relevant factor since the contract between the union and the employer
did not allow for the attendance of lawyers at such meetings. Since the
plaintiff had failed to exhaust her contractual remedies, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment
to the employer.3 2
Successorship Doctrine
This past survey year, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the successorship doctrine in detail and further delineated the reasoning behind the
doctrine and what parties, if any, were subject to the doctrine. In Road
Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. Independent Sprinkler Corp.,S
the union commenced an action requiring arbitration against a union
employer and a nonunion employer that signed a settlement agreement
stating they would participate in arbitration.34 The union also,
C.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id.
10 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1565.

1434

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

however, commenced an action requiring an alleged"successor" nonunion
employer to comply with arbitration that had not signed the agreement.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the union and
required all three employers to arbitrate the issues currently in dispute.
The alleged "successor" employer appealed to the Eleventh Circuit."5
Specifically, the facts revealed that the union represented employees
of Moore Pipe &,Sprinkler Company ("Moore Pipe"), a union contractor
with which the union had a collective bargaining agreement. A
grievance arose over whether Moore Pipe was actually sending work to
another company, Independent Sprinkler & Fire Protection Company
("Independent 1"), a nonunion contractor. The union filed a section 301
suit against Moore Pipe to compel it to arbitrate their grievance, as was
provided for in their collective bargaining agreement. A settlement
agreement was eventually reached, and the union, along with Moore
Pipe and Independent I, signed this agreement.3"
A few months thereafter, another nonunion shop was organized named
Independent Sprinkler Corporation ("Independent II"). Independent II
performed the same type of work as Independent I. The union later
alleged, however, that Independent II was also being awarded contracts
for work within the union territory. The union objected and demanded
that Moore Pipe, Independent I, and Independent II submit to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision of the earlier-reached
settlement agreement. All three companies declined to arbitrate, and
the union filed suit attempting to enforce arbitration. The main thrust
of the union's argument to compel arbitration was that Moore Pipe and
Independent I had agreed to arbitrate based upon the earlier settlement
agreement and, more importantly, the new nonunion shop, Independent
II, was actually a "successor" of Independent I and was, therefore, also
bound by the earlier settlement agreement.3 "
The union moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
such requiring all three companies to arbitrate. All three defendants
appealed. 8
Eventually, however, Moore Pipe and Independent I
voluntarily participated in arbitration and withdrew their appeals.
Thus, the only issue presently before the Eleventh Circuit was whether
or not the district court correctly held that the "successorship doctrine"
required the new nonunion shop, Independent II, to arbitrate pursuant
to the provisions of the settlement agreement.3 9

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1565-66.
Id. at 1565.
Id. at 1566.
Id.
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit initially reiterated the general principles behind
the "successor doctrine.' ° Specifically, the court stated that the
successor relationship created by labor law principles actually arose by
operation of law and was not dependent upon any agreement by the
successor that it should have successor status." The court noted that
this labor law based relationship originally came about simply to protect
the collective bargaining interests of employees of predecessor employers
who had been employed by a successor company that had "substantial
and sufficient continuity" with the predecessors themselves.42 This
doctrine was- simply an extension of the presumption in labor law that
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement and one year
thereafter, the certified union was and should remain the proper
bargaining agent. Therefore, based on this doctrine, the successor
corporation was then required to engage in collective bargaining with the
union.43
Even though a successor was required to engage in the collective
bargaining with the union, the court stated that, ordinarily, the
successor would not be bound by substantive provisions of a preexisting
collective bargaining agreement between the union and the predecessor." In addition, the court noted that there were several factors that
one should review carefully before determining whether an employer was
the successor of another." In the present case, however, the Eleventh
Circuit found that they did not need to analyze the detailed relationship
between Independent I and Independent IIL Instead, since there had
been no collective bargaining agreement drawn out between the union
and the alleged predecessor, Independent I, there was no such collective
bargaining agreement that could have been "passed on" to the alleged
successor company, Independent II. 7
Since the only preexisting collective bargaining agreement was
between the union and Moore Pipe, the successorship doctrine could not
be utilized to force an alleged successor employer into a collective
bargaining relationship in which the alleged predecessor was not even

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987)).
44. Id. at 1566-67.
45. Id. at 1567 (citing International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Centor Contracts, 831
F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1987)).
46. Id
47. Id.
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a participant.' Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the union as against
Independent II and in denying summary judgment to Independent II
based upon this issue.""
D. Union Elections
In Reich v. InternationalAlliance of Theatrical Stage Employees &
Moving Picture Machine Operators,AFL-CIO,' the Eleventh Circuit
again analyzed in detail the appropriateness of a union election. In this
case, the Secretary of Labor filed a complaint alleging that a local union
officer election violated the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act5 1 by allowing ineligible candidates to run for and hold union
office.52 Specifically, the Secretary of Labor challenged the election of
Victor Meyrich as president of the local union contending that Mr.
Meyrich was a manager in his place of employment and was, therefore,
not eligible to run for office under the terms of the constitution of the
union. Following a nonjury trial, the district court held that Meyrich fell
within the category of persons prohibited from running for union office,
and accordingly, the district court ordered a new election for the
president of Local 412.' The union then appealed this issue to the
Eleventh Circuit."
The facts revealed that Meyrich had served as president of Local 412
for several years, but at the time of the election in question, December
1990, Meyrich was actually the "production supervisor for the Asolo
Center for the Performing Arts." His job description stated that he
was specifically responsible for all overall physical aspects of the Asolo
Theater operations and that he was to spend thirty percent of his time
maintaining production schedules, twenty-five percent of his time
advising department heads on building techniques, twenty percent of his
time maintaining the building and equipment, ten percent of his time
purchasing equipment and supplies, ten percent of his time maintaining
accounts, and only five percent of his time on other duties. The record
revealed that Meyrich spent only approximately three percent of his time

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 1568.
32 F.3d 512 (11th Cir. 1994).
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
32 F.3d at 513.
Id.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 513.
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performing true "stage work" and that such work was only incidental to
his functions as the production supervisor. 6
Moreover, as production supervisor, Meyrich was over four departments, with each department having a supervisor who reported directly
to him. Meyrich had the authority to hire, fire, and even discipline
employees in these departments, and he received managerial employee
benefits that nonmanagers did not receive. It was uncovered that
Meyrich's position as president of Local 412 did conflict with his duties
as production supervisor when he was unable to participate with
management in the preparation of a strike plan, which a production
supervisor would ordinarily participate in.5"
In analyzing this case, the court noted that following a union election,
and after exhausting all internal remedies, any member could file a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor "alleging the violation of any
provision of Section 481 of [Title 291. ..

.'

Once they filed this

complaint, however, the Secretary of Labor was obligated to investigate
and determine if there was probable cause to believe a violation of
Section 481 had occurred.59 If a violation had occurred, the Secretary
of Labor must then file a civil action to set aside the invalid election.
Specifically, subsection 481(e) provided: "The election shall be conducted
in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of such organization
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter.' ° When reviewing the Secretary of Labor's claim, however, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that a court must accept the interpretation
placed upon the constitution by the union if that interpretation is in any
way fair and reasonable."'
In the present case, the union argued initially that Meyrich was not
a manager.6 2 Based on the overwhelming evidence and facts cited
above, the Eleventh Circuit found that argument to be without merit.6
Second, the union argued that even if Meyrich was a manager, he did
not fall within the disqualifications set out in the constitution because
he did not function solely as a manager. 4 The court noted, however,
that section 15 of the union constitution disqualified any member who
"accepted a position as a manager... except where the duties of such
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 481(e)).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.

64. Id.
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person shall also be those of a projectionist or stage employee."4 The
court of appeals held that the local union's interpretation of this
provision was not reasonable; therefore, the court was not bound by their
interpretation."
Specifically, the court went on to state that in interpreting labor union
constitutions, courts should follow the well-settled rules of statutory
construction, one of which was that each word, if possible, should be
given some type of "operative effect."67 Under the union's interpretation of section 15, however, the court of appeals stated that any manager
who performed the work of his subordinates, no matter how infrequently,
could avoid disqualification.68 That interpretation would render section
15 essentially meaningless; therefore, the Eleventh Circuit found that
Meyrich's occasional performance of stage work did not bring him within
the exception
to disqualification under section 15 of the union con69
tract.
The union tried to argue that the Secretary of Labor lacked authority
to seek to invalidate an election on the grounds that the union permitted
managers or supervisors to seek and hold office.7" In support of this
argument, they relied upon Brock v. Writers Guild of America, West,
Inc., in which the Ninth Circuit found the Secretary of Labor was not
authorized to challenge a union's decision to permit supervisors to
participate as candidates in a union election. 2 The Eleventh Circuit
noted, however, that Writers Guild was distinguishable from the present
one because the Writers Guild's constitution had not imposed any
restrictions on supervisory candidacy for office.7' The court in Writers
Guild had simply held that the Secretary of Labor could not unilaterally
allege a violation of section 481(e) when the union contract itself did not
delineate such behavior as unlawful. 4 Therefore, Writers Guild was
not controlling.75

65.

Id.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 515-16.
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id.
762 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1985).
32 F.3d at 516.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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E. Criminal and Civil Penalties
This survey year, the Eleventh Circuit addressed two noteworthy
cases, both of which evolved out of the same set of facts. The first case,
United States v. Phillips,76 involved criminal penalties for unlawful
behavior by union employees and the second case, Cox v. Administrator,
United States Steel & Carnegie," involved civil sanctions applicable
against a union for unlawful behavior of union employees. Both of these
cases are important in emphasizing the harsh repercussions union
members, unions themselves, and employers can suffer if they participate in unlawful behavior while entering into contract negotiations.
To understand the gravity of the violations involved in both of these
cases, it is necessary to have a good understanding of the underlying
facts. The employer involved in both of these cases was a major steel
producer in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, named USX Corporation ("USX").
USX owned and operated a number of mills throughout the United
States. The steel workers in these mills were represented by the United
Steel Workers of America, International Union ("Union"). A basic
collective bargaining agreement was negotiated by USX and the Union's
principle officers every three years. There were also, however, "local
collective bargaining agreements" between the USX and the Union's
locals, which were negotiated after the basic agreement was reached.
The local agreements were usually negotiated by the Union's district
directors and sub-district directors responsible for the Union's district in
whatever area the steel mill was located. 8
The incident that precipitated the criminal convictions and subsequent
civil lawsuit began during the negotiations of a local agreement between
USX and ten locals at USX's Fairfield steel mill in Birmingham,
Alabama. The negotiations started in September 1983, and at that time,
the steel market was very depressed and many of USX's mills were not
operating. USX had stated earlier that they were not willing to resume
production at these mills unless the local unions agreed to a permanent
reduction in the labor force and several other concessions to reduce the
cost of salaries.79
Thurman Phillips and E.B. Rich, the Union officials located in the
Fairfield district, were district director and sub-district director,
respectfully. The Union assigned them to negotiate the local agreement
for the Fairfield steel workers, and Phillips and Rich were full-time
76. 19 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1994).
77. 17 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir.), modified, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994).
78. 19 F.3d at 1567-72.

79. Id.
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employees. Prior to coming to work for the Union full time, both Phillips
and Rich had worked for USX, and when they left USX's employment,
the basic collective bargaining agreement provided that a worker who
wanted to leave USX to become a Union employee could request that
USX grant them a one-year "leave of absence." During this leave of
absence, the worker would continue to stay on the payroll and accrue
additional time needed for pension purposes. If requested, USX could
extend the leave for another year, but they could not extend it past two
consecutive years. Thus, to prevent a break in an employee's continuous
service and ultimately save their pension monies, a worker who left USX
to accept Union employment had to return to USX before their leave of
absence expired.'
Neither Phillips nor Rich returned to USX after leaving its employment, and at the time they were negotiating the local agreement, they
had lost whatever rights they might have had to receive a USX pension.
While negotiating the local agreement and, thus, the resumption of
production at the Fairfield plant, Phillips and Rich demanded from USX
that they award them enough "continuous service" to entitle them to
immediately retire from USX's employment and receive a pension. They
also demanded similar treatment for six other Union members of
Phillips' staff.8 1
After several months of negotiations, an agreement was finally
reached between the Union and USX. This agreement called for a
reduction in the work force at the Fairfield mill, a reduction in the
incentive pay for its workers, as well as an elimination of most of the
restrictive work practices. In addition, USX agreed to Phillips' and
Rich's demand that they, along with several of their employees, begin
receiving pension payments immediately.82
1. United States v. Phillips. In Phillips, a federal grand jury
returned a sixteen-count indictment against USX, Phillips, and Rich.
Count I charged all the defendants with conspiracy to make and receive
payments prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act ("Act").' Counts II and
III charged Rich and Phillips, respectfully, with receiving payments in
violation of section 186(b)(1). Counts IV and V charged USX with
making payments to Phillips and Rich, respectfully, in violation of
section 186(a)(1). Counts VI through XV charged USX, Phillips, and
Rich with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Count XVI

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

83. Id. at 1573 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 186(aX4) and (b)(1978 &Supp. 1993)).
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charged USX with failing to notify the pension plan participants of the
modification of their pension plan in violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1131.8
After the criminal trial in March 1990, the district court granted the
government's motion to dismiss the mail fraud charges against Phillips.
The case went to the jury on all of the remaining charges, and but for an
acquittal for Rich on the mail fraud counts, they returned verdicts of
guilty on all remaining counts against all three defendants. USX,
Phillips, and Rich then appealed their convictions to the Eleventh
Circuit.85
Although numerous claims of error were raised on appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit only addressed three issues: (1) defendants argued that
the court's jury instructions on an exception to the prohibitions of the
Taft-Hartley Act precluded a "legitimate defense" argument that
payment by an employer to his former employee was not prohibited by
the Act, so long as the payment was made "by reason of" the employee's
service and was not a bribe; (2) defendants argued that the district
court's charge to the jury on the criminal enforcement provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act allowed the jury to convict on Counts II through V
without finding the requisite level of criminal intent; and (3) defendants
argued that the court's jury instructions on the issue of criminal
enforcement provisions of ERISA also allowed them to convict on Count
XVI without a finding of the appropriate requisite of criminal intent.8
After reviewing the facts and law in this case thoroughly, the court of
appeals upheld the jury's convictions in their entirety.8 7
First, the court found that section 186(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act did
prohibit employers and industries affecting interstate commerce from
paying anything of value to representatives of their employees or union
officials.' The court also noted that section 186(b) prohibited representatives and union officials from receiving such payments.8 9
The
defendants argued, however, that section 186(c)(1) contained an
exception to the broad prohibitions of section 186(a) and (b). Specifically,
section 186(c)(1) provided that the prohibitions outlined above were not
applicable "in respect to any money... payable by an employer to...
any officer or employee of a labor organization, who was also an
employee or former employee of such employer, as compensation for, or

84. Id. at 1572.
85. Id. at 1573.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 1567.
Id. at 1574.
Id.
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by reason of, his service as an employee of such employer.' ° Thus,
defendants contended that the pension payments USX made to Phillips
and Rich qualified for this exception because the payments were given
"by reason of' their services as former employees. 9
The court of appeals, however, disagreed with the defendants'
interpretation of section 186(c)(1), as well as their interpretation of the
trial court's jury instructions.92 Specifically, the court of appeals held
that all payments given by an employer to a former employee must be
for past services actually rendered by them while they were employed by
the employer in order for any monies they received to qualify for the
exception under section 186(c)(1)."
Since neither Rich nor Phillips
were actually employees of USX at the time they began receiving their
pension monies, their payments would only fall under the Section
186(c)(1) exception if their right to such payments vested fully before
their leave of absence began. The facts clearly revealed that Rich and
Phillips did not have a right to the pension payments at the time they
ceased working for USX Corporation and, thus, these monies did not fall
under the exception as provided for under Section 186(c)(1)."
Second, the court of appeals addressed the defendants' claim that the
district court misinterpreted the term "willfully" as used both in 29
U.S.C. § 186(d)(2) and in 29 U.S.C. § 1131, the applicable criminal
enforcement provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA.9' In their
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that there was a split of
opinion between the circuit courts on the correct interpretation of
"willful" under these Acts.'
Some circuits required a showing of a
specific intent to violate the provisions outlined above, whereas other
circuits required only a finding of a general intent to violate the
statutes.9
After reviewing the legislative history involved in the
criminal enforcement provisions of both the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the appropriate mens rea needed to show
"willfulness" was only that of general intent, not specific intent, to
commit a crime."

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 1574-75.
Id. at 1575.
Id.
Id. at 1575-76.
Id. at 1576.
Id. at 1577-78.
Id. (citations omitted).
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2. Cox v. Administrator, United States Steel & Carnegie. In the
civil case involving the same facts cited above, the union members
brought an action against the Union and USX based upon Rich's and
Phillips' agreement to concede certain issues in the collective bargaining
agreement in exchange for pension payments directly to them from
USX."3 The union members' complaint asserted five claims against
USX, the Pension Fund, and the Union. Count I alleged that the
defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). 10 ° Count II alleged that the Union breached its duty of
fair representation and that USX breached its contractual duties in
violation of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA") " ' Count III alleged that USX and the Union committed an
unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") by failing to negotiate in good faith."0 Count IV alleged that
defendants violated their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") by failing to notify the plaintiffs or
the Department of Labor of the change of the company's leave policy. 103 Count V alleged violations of 29 U.S.C.A. § 186 and sought an
order enjoining the defendants from future violations.'"
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment against USX and the Union on the plaintiffs' claims under
RICO and the LMRA, section 301. The district court also dismissed the
unfair labor practice claim on the ground that the National Labor
Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. The district
court then granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs' ERISA claim against the Union and entered final judgment on
those claims as to which summary judgment was granted, with the
exception of the claim against the Union for violation of the duty of fair
representation under section 310 of the LMRA.'05 In appealing the
district court's final judgment, the plaintiffs abandoned the ERISA claim
against the Union and the NLRA claim and appealed only the award of
summary judgment on the RICO claim and the section 301 claim against
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
USX for breach of contract. '
district court's grant of summary judgment on the RICO claim against

99. 17 F.3d at 1392.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1394 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988)).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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USX and the Union, as well as the court's grant of summary judgment
on the07 plaintiffs' section 301 claim against USX for breach of con1
tract.
Specifically, after reviewing the facts of the case in detail, the
Eleventh Circuit found that, contrary to the district court's opinion, the
plaintiffs were able to create a genuine issue of material fact about the
existence of a violation of the RICO Act against the negotiators, Phillips
and Rich."0 ' The court then turned their attention to whether the
Union itself could be held liable under RICO for acts of its representatives."' The Union argued that because it was "the victim of the
racketeering activity of its negotiators," it could not be held liable for
their violations.'
The plaintiffs, however, contended that the Union
could be liable under RICO under several theories. First, the plaintiffs
contended that the Union was liable under the principle of respondeat
superior. In addition, they contended that the Union was liable under
RICO for violation of a fiduciary duty, ratification of their agents' RICO
violations, aiding and abetting liability under RICO, and co-conspirators'
liability under RICO."' The court addressed each theory separately
and, interestingly enough, found that the Union could be responsible for
a RICO violation of their agents under several theories."'
a. Liability of "Victim" Enterprise Under RICO. The Union argued
that Congress did not intend RICO liability to attach to legitimate
enterprises when they were used as "passive instruments for the
racketeering activities of employees or others.""'
Specifically, the
Union contended that liability attached only to the wrongdoing
individual, not the enterprise itself. The Eleventh Circuit stated that
the Union's main authority for the proposition that an enterprise was
not liable under RICO was the Seventh Circuit case of Haroco, Inc. v.
American National Bank & Trust Co." 4 In Haroco, the Seventh
Circuit found that a corporation could only be liable under RICO when
it was actually the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of
racketeering activity, but if it was merely the victim, or a5 "passive
instrument of racketeering," then liability would not attach."
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After reviewing the reasoning behind Haroco, as well as others, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the RICO exception to the application of
vicarious liability was truly a very narrow exception and had been
Therefore, it
created solely to preserve the "nonidentity rule.""1
actually protected only employers who were also the RICO enterprise for
purposes of section 1962(c).' 7 The court went on to hold, however,
that they: "Squarely rejected the nonidentity rule, observing that
liability for the acts of one's agent '[was] simply a reality to be faced by
corporate entities."' With the advantages of incorporation must come
the appendant responsibilities.'"" 9 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the "victim" enterprise theory was inapplicable in this circuit
and refused to adopt the nonidentity rule." °
b. Respondeat Superior Liability Under RICO. The Eleventh Circuit
also held that the Union could be liable under the RICO Act based upon
the theory of respondeat superior.'
Specifically, the court noted that
the elements of respondeat superior for RICO violations were laid out in
their previous opinion in Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman County. 2
In Quick, the court outlined the principles for general agency liability
and how they should be applied in determining whether a prima facie
case of vicarious liability under RICO had been made out.12 The court
in Quick held that a corporation could be vicariously liable when the
wrongful acts of the employee were: (1) related to and committed within
the course of employment; (2) committed in furtherance of the business
of the corporation; and (3) authorized or subsequently acquiesced in by
the corporation. 24
In the present case, the Eleventh Circuit found that, because Rich and
Phillips had made the demand for personal pension while performing
their duties as Union representatives, a reasonable jury could conclude
that their actions were committed in the course of their employment. 25
Moreover, since the request for the personal pension benefits related to
their "function of negotiating on behalf of the Union," the court of
appeals held that a reasonable jury could conclude their actions were
committed in furtherance of the business of the Union and, therefore, the
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plaintiffs had satisfied the second element needed for establishing
respondeat superior liability.12 The Eleventh Circuit found that the
Union's failure to investigate the allegations against their agents, their
failure to discipline them in a timely manner, along with their attempt
to cover up the wrongdoing, could lead a reasonable jury to find that the
Union had "acquiesced in their misdeeds."127 Consequently, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
on this issue and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim of
liability against
the Union based upon the theory of respondeat
28s
superior.
c. RICO Liability for Violation of FiduciaryDuty. In contrast, the
court of appeals held that the Union could not be liable for the acts of its
representatives under the theory that it had violated a fiduciary duty to
its members. 129 The court reasoned that a breach of fiduciary duty
was not, in and of itself, the same as a racketeering activity needed in
order to state a claim under RICO.13 Therefore, the plaintiffs' fiduciary duty theory of liability was subject to defendant's summary judgment
motion, and the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling on
this issue.' 3'
d. Liabilityfor RatificationofAgents'RICO Violations. The plaintiffs
also contended that the Union was liable for the agents' RICO violations
because it had failed to investigate or discipline the agents in a timely
manner and that it also actually tried to conceal the pensions that the
agents had received. These actions on the part of the Union the
plaintiffs contended constituted ratification. 32 The Union argued that
it could not be liable for the acts of its negotiators under the theory of
ratification unless they had "full knowledge" of the bribery scheme, and
since there was no33evidence that they did, liability under this theory was
1
not appropriate.
The Eleventh Circuit held, however, that a "principle can ratify the
unauthorized act of an agent purportedly done on behalf of the principle
either expressly or by implication through conduct that is inconsistent
with an intention to repudiate the unauthorized act. " "4 Thus, proof

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
denied,

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1407-08.
Id. at 1409.
Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1408-09.
Id. at 1409.
Id.
Id. (citing McDonald v. Hamilton Elec., Inc., 666 F.2d 509, 514 (11th Cir.), cert
459 U.S. 879 (1982)).

1995]

LABOR LAW

1447

of ratification could be based upon circumstantial evidence, and there
was substantial circumstantial evidence that the Union did ratify
Phillips' and Rich's acts in this case. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue
and allowed the plaintiff to proceed on this theory.'
e. Aiding and Abetting Liability Under RICO. Based on this theory,
the plaintiffs contended that the Union was liable under RICO for aiding
and abetting the violations that Rich and Phillips committed, either
because they failed to take any action against them or because they
actively and affirmatively attempted to conceal their misdeeds.'
The
district court held that the Union could not be liable under this theory
because there must have been evidence that the Union committed some
overt act, not a mere acquiescence in the misdeeds."'
The court of appeals, however, reversed this ruling of the district court
and clearly stated that to establish civil liability for aiding and abetting
under the RICO Act, the plaintiffs must only show: (1) that the
defendants were generally aware of the defendants' role as part of an
overall improper activity at the time when he provided the assistance
and (2) that the defendants knowingly and substantially assisted the
principle violation."8 Again, the court reiterated that the defendants'
knowledge on this issue could be shown by circumstantial evidence or by
only reckless conduct. 9 Given the facts of this case, the Eleventh
Circuit found that there was evidence to support a jury finding that the
Union "knowingly tolerated" the agents' actions and, therefore, the
Union could be liable under RICO for actually aiding and abetting the
actions of its agents." °
f. Co-ConspiratorsLiability Under RICO. The plaintiffs argued that
the Union was liable for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which made it a
crime for any person to "conspire to violate any of the" RICO provisions."" The district court found that if the plaintiffs were able to
show that the Union had concealed the racketeering activities, then a
jury could reasonably infer that the Union had joined in the conspiraThe Eleventh Circuit agreed with this analysis and stated that
cy.
the Union could be liable under this co-conspirator theory as well.""
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THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Statute of Limitations and the Continuing Violation Doctrine

In Knight v. Columbus,'" plaintiffs brought suit against the city's
fire department alleging various violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The plaintiffs consisted of former, present, and future nonofficer
and officer employees with the fire department of Columbus, Geor45
gia.1
In relation to the nonofficer plaintiffs, the facts revealed that the city
had always treated them as being employees covered by the overtime
provisions of the FLSA. The nonofficers alleged, however, that on July
1, 1987, in order to evade the financial effects of the FLSA, the city
denied a 7.5 percent pay increase to the nonofficers, yet granted such a
pay increase to all other city public safety employees not eligible for
overtime.'46 The officer plaintiffs, on the other hand, alleged that the
city had misclassified them as exempt executive or administrative
employees and had, therefore, failed to pay them the overtime they were
owed. 4 7 The city moved for summary judgment arguing, among other
things, that the nonofficer and officer claims were barred by the statute
of limitations."" The district court agreed with the defendants and
granted summary judgment against both groups of plaintiffs' claims in
their entirety. Both groups of plaintiffs appealed, contending that their
claims were timely filed under the "continuing violation" doctrine.'4 9
In relation to the officer plaintiffs, the city argued before the district
court that first, the officer plaintiffs were exempt from the FLSA
overtime requirements since the FLSA exempts from its overtime
provisions "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or profession capacity. .

. ."'o

In the alternative, the city argued

that even if the officer plaintiffs were not exempt, their claim was
untimely because the city adopted this classification system more than
three years ago.15 ' The FLSA states that actions are "forever barred"
unless "commenc[ed] within two years after the cause of the action

144. 19 F.3d 579 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 318 (1994).
145. 19 F.3d at 580.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Id. at 581 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1) (1965 & Supp. 1993)); see also 29 C.F.R.
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accrue[ s] ."
This statute of limitations, however, is extended to three
years if the violation of the FLSA is found to be "willful."'53
After reviewing the case law on the issue of the FLSA statute of
limitations, the court of appeals reversed the district court's finding that
the officer plaintiffs' claims were time barred. 5 4 Specifically, the court
noted that each failure to pay overtime to the officer plaintiffs constituted a new violation of the FLSA.' 5 The theory upon which the officer
plaintiffs relied to demonstrate that their claims were not time barred
was called the "continuing violation theory." The court of appeals,
however, noted that this term was somewhat of a misnomer in the
present circumstances. 5 ' The court stated that it was not so much
that the city refused to change their policy or had one continuous
violation that enabled the plaintiffs to continue to state a claim.' 57
What was determinative for statute of limitation purposes was that the
officer plaintiffs were able to show that they had "worked unpaid
overtime hours during the statute of limitations window." 5 '
Moreover, because each violation gave rise to a new cause of action,
the court stated that each failure to pay overtime began a new statute
of limitations as to that particular event.' 59 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the officer plaintiffs had a nonbarred cause of action
with respect to any claim that accrued within two years, or three years
if the city's violations were found to be willful, from the date the
complaint was actually filed with the court. 60 The plaintiffs, however,
would be allowed to recover only overtime hours worked dating back to
the beginning of the statute of limitations period, even though the
original 6misclassification
occurred outside of this statute of limitations
1
period.'
In relation to the nonofficer plaintiffs, however, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.'6 The court found in this instance that the nonofficers had not
suffered from repeated violations of the FLSA.' 3 Instead, the non-
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officers alleged that on July 1, 1987 the city failed to grant them a raise
as they granted to overtime-exempt city employees.. In this case, the
claim of discrimination was premised upon a "discrete act," and at the
time of this act, the statute of limitations began to run upon the nonofficer plaintiffs. Since the nonofficer plaintiffs failed to timely file their
complaint based upon this one act on July 1, 1987, their claims were
time-barred entirely.1
B. Jurisdictionand the "Window of Correction"Provision Under the
FLSA
The case of Lee v. Flightsafety Services Corp." contained several
interesting issues on appeal. The plaintiffs in this case consisted of four
types of employees: (1) firefighters, (2) engineers, (3) fire captains, and
(4) assistant chiefs, all of which worked at the Kings Bay Navel
Submarine Base in Camden County, Georgia. The firefighters and
engineers were paid based upon an hourly wage and worked under a
collective bargaining agreement between the contractor and their local
union.' " The union represented all union employees at Kings Bay, not
just the firefighters and the engineers. The firefighters and engineers,
however, worked twenty-four-hour shifts. They received their full hourly
wage for the first eight hours and time and a half for the second eighthour period. During the third eight-hour period, however, they were free
to do what they wanted, including sleeping in the facilities that were
provided as long as they remained on the premises if called to duty.l 7
The captains and assistant chiefs worked three twenty-four-hour shifts
per week. These individuals, however, did not belong to a union. On
November 25, 1991, the fire department published a memorandum
stating that salary to firemen working less than three twenty-four-hour
shifts per week would have leave time charged against them. This
policy was rescinded approximately one year later after learning that the
FLSA and its regulations prohibited charging salaried employees leave
time when they worked less than an entire shift. The employer then
reimbursed each captain and assistant chief those wages which had been
reduced because of the incorrect policy of November 1991.'
The firefighters and engineers filed suit arguing that their FLSA right
to overtime pay had been improperly bargained away by their union
when the union conceded that they would not receive overtime pay
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during the period of time they were in their twenty-four-hour shift
entitled "sleep time." 9 The captains and assistant chiefs filed suit
alleging that the defendant had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
when they issued the erroneous policy charging leave time against them
in November 1991.1'0 The district court granted summary judgment
to the defendants on the firefighters' and engineers' claims entirely. 1 '
The defendants had also argued that they were entitled to summary
judgment against all plaintiffs because the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The district court disagreed with the defendants' argument
on the issue of jurisdiction and denied their motion to dismiss the case
entirely. In addition, however, the plaintiffs had requested summary
judgment on the claims for the captains and assistant chiefs, but the
district court denied their request as well.'
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction. As noted above, the defendants
moved for dismissal or, in the alternative, summary judgment against
all plaintiffs claiming that: (1) the Service Contract Act ("SCA"'73
applied to the employment relation at hand; (2) the plaintiffs lacked
standing under the SCA; and (3) the plaintiffs could not file a claim
under the FLSA in this matter.74 The defendants contended that
because the firefighters and engineers had been hourly employees of
government contractors who were, in turn, subject to the SCA, the SCA
alone, and not the FLSA, controlled any wage-related claim. 7 '
After reviewing the case law on this issue, the court of appeals found
that this court did have proper subject matter jurisdiction and that the
FLSA was the appropriate avenue for the plaintiffs to pursue. 76 The
court noted that "Congress intended that the FLSA overlap with other
federal legislation."'7 7 Moreover, the FLSA was not mutually exclusive
from other statutes and the provisions of it, along with the SCA, could
apply at the same time as long as they did not conflict. 1 78 The court
then held that since there was no conflict with the SCA, and the FLSA
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in this case, the plaintiffs were perfectly within their rights to pursue
any remedies they might have under the FLSA."7
2. Bargained Away Overtime Pay. In relation to the claim of the
firefighters and engineers, the defendants argued that these employees
were not entitled to overtime pay during their "sleep time" because in
the union contract with the company, the firefighters and engineers had
agreed not to receive overtime pay during this eight-hour shift. The
firefighters and engineers, however, contended that their FLSA right to
overtime pay had been improperly bargained away by the union
contract.'so
The court noted that, in general, FLSA rights could not be abridged by
contract or otherwise waived because this would "nullify the purposes"
of the FLSA statute itself.'
In the present case, however, the
Eleventh Circuit found that no statutory right of the firefighters and
engineers had been abridged or waived by the contract. 18 2 The Code
of Federal Regulation provided:
Where an employee is required to be on duty for 24 hours or more, the
employer and the employee may agree to exclude bona fide meal
periods and a bona fide regularly scheduled sleep period of not more
than eight hours from the hours worked, provided adequate sleeping
facilities are furnished by the employer and the employee can usually
enjoy an uninterrupted mght's sleep."s
Since the above regulation specifically allowed for this type of arrangement that the union had entered into with the employer, there had been
no attempt to waive a statutory right. Consequently, the court of
appeals found that the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendants on this issue was proper.'"'
3. Window of Correction. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's
denial of their motion for summary judgment on the claims of the
captains and assistant chiefs. In denying the plaintiffs' motion, the
district court had found that the defendants had not properly compensated the captains and the assistant chiefs but that the defendants had
adequately addressed the issue through the "window of correction"
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allowed under 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6).'
nent part provided:

1453
This regulation in perti-

Where deductions are generally made when there is no work available,
it indicates that there was no intention to pay the employee on a salary
basis. In such a case the exemption would not be applicable to him
during the entire period when such deductions were being made. On
the other hand, where a deduction not permitted by these interpretations is inadvertent, or is made for reasons other than lack of work, the
exemption will not be considered to have been lost if the employer
reimburses the employee for such deduction and promises to comply in
the future.186
The plaintiffs argued that this particular language meant that the
window of correction was available only if the error was inadvertent.
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized, however, the language in the
regulation stating "or is made for reasons other than lack of work."'8 7
The court reasoned that this additional language in the statute clearly
showed that the window of opportunity was unavailable only if the
deduction was inadvertent. Clearly, under either circumstance noted
above in the regulation, the window of correction would have been
available for the defendants.'
IV. OSHA
A.

Unconstitutionally Vague Regulations
In Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
8 9 the Secretary of Labor brought an action to enforce the
Commission,"
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's citation against an
employer for alleged violations of a standard relating to the operation of
a forklift. The administrative law judge rejected the employer's
argument that the standard was unenforceably vague, but concluded the
company had not violated the standard and vacated the citation. The
Secretary of Labor then appealed to the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, which found that the employer had violated the
At that time, the employer
standard and assessed a penalty.'"
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appealed the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission's
award to the court of appeals. 9 1
The facts revealed that a fork lift being operated by Donald Garrett,
an employee of Georgia Pacific Corporation, was traveling in a forward
direction carrying a load of plywood from a press to a stacking area in
the plant. The load Garrett was carrying was approximately sixty
inches high, and as Garrett turned into the intersection of the press and
rail-to-stacking aisles, the forklift struck and killed another Georgia
Pacific employee who was squatting down painting a column.'
The
Secretary of Labor then investigated the situation and issued a citation
to Georgia Pacific relying upon the standard involving powered
industrial trucks. Specifically, this standard stated: "[While traveling]
the driver shall be required to slow down and sound the horn at cross
aisles and other locations where vision is obstructed. If the load being
carried obstructs forward view, the driver shall be required to travel
with the load trailing."""3 The Secretary found that Georgia Pacific
had violated this standard and that the operator should have been
traveling in reverse with his load trailing.'" After Georgia Pacific
contested the citation, the administrative law judge found that the words
"obstructs forward view" as used in the standard meant that the
operator did not have a clear view of the path of travel, but this only
applied when the operator could not see any part of a pedestrian walking
or standing in an upright position."' Since this particular individual
was killed in a squatting position, the administrative law judge held that
Georgia Pacific had not violated this standard.'"
On appeal, the Commission interpreted the phrase "obstructs forward
view" as meaning any obstruction whatsoever, whether the individual
was in an upright position or a squatting position. 97 The Commission
then concluded that the Secretary had proven that the operator's view
was obstructed under the conditions present at the Georgia Pacific plant;
therefore, the citation was reinstated along with a civil penalty.'
The Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed the Commission's award
finding: (1) the Secretary's definition of the standard was unreasonable
and (2) the standard itself was unconstitutionally vague.'" Specifical-
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ly, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that usually an agency's
construction of its own regulation was entitled to substantial deference.' ° The court found that the Secretary's interpretation of the
regulation in this case, however, was unreasonable because such strict
interpretations would require all forklifts, regardless of the size of the
load carried or the degree of obstruction, to travel with the load trailing,
and the facts were clear that sometimes this mode of transportation was
just as unsafe as traveling with the view obstructed."° Moreover, the
court noted that the Secretary's interpretation was for all purposes
impractical and could end up banning the use of forklifts altogether.2" 2
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held that the actual litigation which
ensued after this citation demonstrated that the regulation itself was
extremely vague.'
A statute or regulation is considered unconstitutionally vague under
the due process clause of the 5th or 14th Amendments if it "forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its

application."2 4

Interestingly enough, the court of appeals made special mention of the
fact that when a regulation such as this was so vague, it would be best
for the Secretary to remedy the situation himself by promulgating a
clear regulation rather than "forcing the judiciary to press the limits of
judicial construction."2 5 Based upon the foregoing, the Eleventh
Circuit vacated the citation and encouraged the Secretary of Labor to
promulgate a reasonable and more specific standard on the operation of
fork lifts.W6
B. Willful Vilations
Reich v. Trinity Industries, Inc."0° was one of the more noteworthy
decisions concerning OSHA regulations in the survey year of 1994. In
this case, the Secretary of Labor brought an enforcement action against
Trinity, the employer, for violating 29 U.S.C. §§ 654(a) and 655 which
required that employers establish and maintain a hearing conservation
200. Id. at 1004 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 1004-05.
202. Id. at 1005.
203. Id. at 1005-06.

204. Id. at 1005 (citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926);
Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 831 (9th. Cir. 1981)).

205. Id. at 1006 (citations omitted).
206. Id.
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program when information indicated that the noise exposure level
equaled or exceeded an eight hour time-weighted average sound level of
85 decibels. ' Testimony at trial clearly indicated that Trinity was
aware that their noise levels exceeded 85 decibels but decided not to
provide monitoring as required. Trinity admitted that they were aware
of the OSHA regulations under Section 1910.95, but instead of implementing these procedures, the company decided that they would provide
their employees with hearing protection devices which they believed to
hearing conservation program as outlined
be a superior program to 2the
0
in the OSHA regulations.
When the Secretary brought this enforcement action, the administrative law judge determined that Trinity had not "willfully" failed to
comply with this OSHA regulation. The administrative law judge then
The Secretary then
labeled the citation as being "nonserious."
appealed the administrative law judge's decision to the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission rejected the
Secretary's determination that the citation was willful and agreed with
the administrative law judge that Trinity's violation was not serious
based upon its finding that Trinity acted in "good faith," and the
employees were "largely protected." After the Commission's ruling, the
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
Secretary filed this appeal, and
211
Commission's findings entirely.
The court of appeals specifically held that whether or not an employer
acted in good faith in refusing to cooperate with an OSHA requirement
was not the determining factor as to whether or not they had "willfully"
not complied with the statute. 12 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that the language of section 654 was mandatory when it stated
that employers "shall comply with Occupational Safety and Health
Standards promulgated under this chapter."1 ' Thus, the employer's
good faith belief that its alternative program was superior to OSHA's
requirement had no bearing on whether or not the employer had

willfully violated Section

654.14

The court went on to state that if Trinity had truly believed their
program was superior to that of the OSHA regulation, they could have
requested a variance of exemption from OSHAs mandatory requirements
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213.

Id. at 1151 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(c) (1992)).
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Id. at 1152, 1156.
Id. at 1154.
Id.
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as allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 655(d).15 The facts revealed, however, that
Trinity did not apply for a variance until August 15, 1988, almost two
months after the Secretary issued the citation. Trinity contended that
the variance was requested because OSHA compliance was infeasible.21 The Eleventh Circuit held, however, that the burden of showing
infeasibility was placed upon the employer, and in the present case,
Trinity had not met this burden. 1 7 Thus, the court of appeals found
that Trinity had "willfully" failed to comply with the OSHA regulations
concerning hearing conservation programs and, thus, assessed a penalty
against Trinity for their violation of the Act.218
V.

THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") was the
subject of several Eleventh Circuit decisions this past survey year.
Quite frankly, the litigation in this area has become so prevalent over
the past few years that a survey article addressing solely ERISA issues
might be of benefit in the future. While the cases this past survey year
covered various areas of the Act, this article addresses only a few of the
cases which addressed issues of first impression.
A

ERISA Pre-Emption
As in years past, many of the ERISA claims in 1994 dealt with the

issue of pre-emption over state law claims. In Smith v. Jefferson Pilot
Life Insurance Co.,2' plaintiff brought suit against Jefferson Pilot Life
Insurance Company seeking damages for tortious termination of their
major medical health coverage. Plaintiffs moved for a partial summary
judgment contending, among other things, that if the coverage were part
of an ERISA plan, the state statute underlying their tort claim escaped
preemption through application of the ERISA "savings clause."22 ° The
district court granted the plaintiff's motion on this issue, and the
defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.22 1
In addressing the preemption issue in this case, the Eleventh Circuit
reiterated the clause in ERISA which provided that ERISA "shall
supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
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relate to any employee benefit plan." 2 The ERISA "savings clause,"
however, allows for "any law of any state which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities," to be exempt from the original ERISA preemption clause.' The plaintiff'rs tort claim was based upon a Georgia
insurance regulation which provided that when a policy was cancelled
for failure of the named insured to properly pay premiums, the policy
holder was required to give notice of the termination by delivering or
mailing written. notice to the named insured at least ten days prior to
the effective date of the cancellation.224
Defendants argued that this Georgia statute was preempted by the
ERISA Act, but the plaintiff in turn contended that the statute regulated
insurance and, thus, escaped pre-emption by operation of the ERISA
savings clause.' The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
6 set forth
case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. u. Massachusetts"~
the analysis for determining whether the state law in question was
actually an insurance regulation.227 First, the state law must regulate
insurance within a common sense view of the word "regulate." Second,
the court in Metropolitan noted that state law must also regulate the
"business of insurance."2 2 Whether a particular law met the "business
of insurance" test was based upon three factors: (1) whether the state
law had the effect of transferring or spreading a policy holder's risk, (2)
whether the law impacted an intrical part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and the insured, and (3) whether the law was truly
directed only at entities within the insurance industry."'
The court of appeals initially held that the statute in question clearly
regulated insurance within the common sense portion of the test.2 30
Then after reviewing the three prongs for the "business of insurance"
test, the court concluded that the Georgia notice statute was preempted."' Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Georgia
statute did not have the effect of transferring or spreading the policy
holder's risk.232 Since it was only a notice requirement, no risk
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Id. at 568 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)).
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spreading was even involved. Moreover, the notice requirement failed
the second prong of the "business of insurance" analysis in that the
notice requirement did not truly effect the substantive terms of the
contract. 3 The court further found, however, that the statute did
satisfy the third prong of the "business of insurance" test since it was
aimed solely at entities within the insurance industry.2' Since this
statute failed two out of the three prongs, however, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the district court had correctly pre-empted the Georgia
statute. 5
In the case of Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,"3 the Eleventh Circuit
again addressed whether an employee's state law fraud claims were preempted by ERISA. In this case, the plaintiffs were employed by Sears
and they were informed that the facility where they worked would be
closing in the near future. The plaintiffs expressed their desire to
continue employment with Sears, but Sears informed them that they had
"no choice but to 'voluntarily' retire." 7 After the plaintiffs elected
voluntary retirement, the warehouse where they worked was not closed,
and their jobs were in fact filled by younger employees. The plaintiffs
brought suit against Sears alleging fraudulent inducement to resign
based upon the closing of their facility."' One of the defendants'
defenses was that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs' state law claim of
fraudulent inducement. The district court found that the plaintiffs'
claim actually "related to" an ERISA plan and, therefore, granted
summary judgment to the defendant on this issue. Plaintiffs appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit.239
In analyzing this case, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it had long
recognized the limits of the ERISA preemption.'
Specifically, in
Sanson v. General Motors Corp.,2 the Eleventh Circuit held: "The
mere existence of an ERISA plan [was] not enough for preemption.
Rather, the state law in question must make reference to or function
with respect to the ERISA plan in order for preemption to occur."242
In the present case, the court of appeals found that the plaintiffs' claims
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centered on Sears' alleged fraud concerning the elimination of their jobs,
243
not fraud concerning an ERISA plan or any other benefit package.
Since plaintiffs did not claim any fraud as it related to the amount of
pension benefits received, the court of appeals held that their claim was
not preempted by ERISA.2 "
Furthermore, the Eeventh Circuit addressed ERISA preemption in the
case of Lordmann Enterprises v. Equicor,Inc. 46 In Lordmann Enterprises, a home health care provider sued the administrator of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act group health insurance plan
seeking to recover charges for long-term rehabilitation services that had
been provided to the insured. The plaintiff sued in state court asserting
two claims: (1) a state law claim based upon alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation and (2) a state law claim based upon alleged negligent
misrepresentation. The defendants moved the case to federal court
asserting a federal question and diversity jurisdiction. After removal,
the plaintiff amended his complaint and added two additional federal
claims. In relation to the state law claims, however, defendants moved
for summary judgment arguing that ERISA preempted the state law
claim based upon fraud, as well as the state law claim based upon
negligent misrepresentation.'
The district court granted the defendants' motion
for
summary
judgment
on this issue and the plaintiff
1 7
appealed.
While other issues were also discussed in this case, the court of
appeals specifically analyzed whether the plaintiff's state law claims
were preempted by the ERISA statute.m In relation to the fraud
claim, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had failed to show
it could prevail under Georgia law on this issue; therefore, the court did
not even address the pre-emption issue.24 9 As to the negligent misrepresentation claim, however, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff
could state a claim based upon negligent misrepresentation; therefore,
the court turned to the issue of preemption.2 0
The court noted that both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits had found that
state law claims brought by health care providers against plan insurers
were too tenuously connected with ERISA plans as to be preempted by
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the Act. 1 After analyzing the reasoning behind these cases, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that Congress enacted ERISA to protect the
interest of employees and beneficiaries covered by benefit plans. 2
Since third-party health care providers were not sought to be protected
by congress, the court found that ERISA should not preempt their
Thus, the court of
potential causes of action for misrepresentation.'
appeals held that ERISA did not pre-empt a health care provider's
negligent misrepresentation claim against an insurer under an ERISA
plan.'
The court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment on this issue."
B.

Standardof Review for Arbitrator'sDetermination

Another interesting ERISA case addressed by the Eleventh Circuit
this survey year was that of Kirwan v. Marriott Corp.'s In Kirwan,
the plaintiff brought suit against his former employer to recover longterm disability benefits under a disability plan governed by ERISA.267
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer,
holding that the plan administrator's denial of benefits was not arbitrary
and/or capricious. 5
The Eleventh Circuit reversed this finding,
holding that the district court erred in applying an arbitrary and
capricious standard.2 5 The court of appeals found, instead, that the
standard of review of an administrator's determination of benefits was
that of a de novo review.'
Under a de novo review, the court found
there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary
judgment. '
Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit noted that in Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Brunch,62 the United States Supreme Court held that
a "denial of benefits challenged under Section 1132(a)(1)(B) [was] to be
reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the

251. Id. at 1533 (citing Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins., 944 F.2d
752 (10th Cir. 1991); Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236 (5th
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administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility
for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.' s The Eleventh
Circuit interpreted Firestone as mandating a de novo review unless the
plan expressly provided the administrator with discretionary authority.2" The court stated that only when there was an express provision
of discretion, would the arbitrary and capricious standard apply.'
The plan at issue in this case provided that the named fiduciary had
"authority to control and manage the operation and administration of
the plan.' z The plan did not, however, specifically grant the administrator the authority to deny claims, although it did allow the administrator the right to promulgate such rules and regulations as they deem
necessary. 6 7 The Eleventh Circuit took a very literal approach in
analyzing this particular plan and held that it did not contain express
language "unambiguous in its design" to give the administrator
discretionary authority to construe the terms of the plan.2' Thus, the
court held that a de novo review was appropriate, and applying such
review, reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendants.2 69
VI.

CONCLUSION

As can be seen by a review of the cases cited above, the area of
traditional labor law continues to grow and expand by leaps and bounds.
As noted above, ERISA claims are becoming more popular and the need
for attorney proficiency in this area of practice is crucial. Moreover, a
review of this year's NLRB cases demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit
is more than willing to assess criminal, as well as civil penalties, against
violators of the Act. As in years past, the Eleventh Circuit will no doubt
continue to be a leading circuit in understanding and developing this
area of traditional labor law.
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